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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMING AND GOING RULE ANALYSIS WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF 
FINDING SUNDQUIST WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT 
Appellee White Water asserts on appeal that Sundquist was not acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident because he was merely 
traveling from home to work.1 Relying on the coming and going rule, White Water 
argues that the personal nature of Sundquist's trip outweighs any benefit White Water 
derived from the trip or any control it exercised over Sundquist's travel. Because White 
Water acknowledges that it stood to benefit from the trip—although it does attempt to 
minimize the benefits it derived from the trip—it appears that the parties essentially agree 
that whether the coming and going rule applies in this case turns on the correct weighing 
of the benefits to White Water from the trip and the control it had over the trip verus any 
personal benefit the trip had for Sundquist. See Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 
UT 4,1f 9, 73 P.3d 315 (2003) ("[W]here the employee engages in conduct benefitting the 
employer or which is controlled by the employer, we weigh the benefit and control 
against the personal nature of the trip in order to determine where it is appropriate to 
place liability."). 
Appellant Newman does take issue in several respects, however, with White 
'White Water does not take issue with the analysis in Newman's opening brief of the facts of this 
case under the Birkner criteria for detennining whether an employee's actions fall within the course and 
scope of his employment. See generally Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). 
1 
Water's benefits analysis and its argument that the personal nature of the Sundquist's trip 
to White Water's offices outweighs any benefit to White Water or any control White 
Water exercised over Sundquist's conduct. First, in analyzing who was benefitting from 
Sundquist's trip to White Water the day of the accident, White Water has incorrectly 
included on the scale the personal benefits Sundquist derived from being able to travel 
directly home from the job-site at the end of the work day instead of being required to 
return the materials to White Water before going home. Any personal benefit Sundquist 
gained from his return trip home the night before the accident has no bearing on who was 
benefitting from his trip to White Water the next day when the accident occurred. The 
benefits of the his trip home the night before would only properly come into play as a 
personal benefit if the accident had occurred while Sundquist was traveling to his home 
from the job site and the issue to be decided was whether the trip to his home fell within 
the course and scope of his employment. With the accident here occurring the following 
day during the trip from his home to White Water's offices and the issue being whether 
Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of that particular 
trip, the only benefits that should be considered in the analysis are those that either party 
was deriving from that day's travel at the time of the accident and not the benefits from 
any other trip not at issue. 
Newman also takes issue with White Water's attempts to minimize the benefit it 
was receiving from Sundquist's trip the day of the accident by arguing that Sundquist 
simply could have returned the materials the night before and that his job responsibilities 
did not include transporting the materials to and from his home. White Water does not 
explain how the fact that the materials could have been returned the night before or the 
fact that White Water allowed Sundquist the leeway of keeping materials with him 
overnight at his home and returning them the next day would somehow eliminate or 
lessen the benefit that Wliite Water nevertheless gained from having Sundquist return the 
materials to headquarters. Just because Sundquist's responsibilities did not technically 
including transporting materials to and from his home does not mean that once the 
materials are nevertheless transported to White Water that Wliite Water would not benefit 
from their return. It is clear that White Water needed to have the materials returned for 
later use and that if Sundquist did not transport them back to headquarters, White Water 
would have had to send some other employee to retrieve them. 
White Water's argument also overlooks the fact that White Water sanctioned, or at 
least tacitly approved, Sundquist's practice of returning home with materials following 
work on a job rather than requiring him to return the products the same evening. White 
Water cannot simply hide behind the fact that it was aware of Sundquist's—and other 
installer's—practice of taking materials home and then returning with them to work the 
next day and claim that it had no control over the actions or that it did not nevertheless 
benefit from the return of its products. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated 
Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994), that it is possible for an employer to 
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tactically sanction or approve employee conduct that would normally fall outside of the 
employer's business or be an employee's personal endeavor and have exposure to 
vicarious liability for the conduct. Id at 128. 
In Christensen, the employer was aware that its employees would occasionally 
travel to a restaurant across the street from the workplace during unscheduled breaks to 
get food, but the employer had never disciplined the employees for their conduct nor had 
it sought to put and end to the practice. Id. In analyzing the Birkner criteria, the 
Christensen Court found that there was a question for the jury whether the employer had 
tacitly sanctioned or at least contemplated the practice so as to not be able to hide behind 
the practice and argue that an employee was on a personal endeavor or outside the scope 
of the employer's business when an employee was involved in an accident while making 
the trip to the restaurant. Id 
The Court's analysis in Christensen is instructive in this case, as it is clear that 
White Water was aware of Sundquist's practice of returning home from a job site with 
unused materials that he would transport to White Water the next day and that the practice 
was not exclusive to Sundquist. White Water had therefore tactically approved or had, at 
least, not taken any affirmative steps to put an end to.2 It follows in this case, then, that 
2In his deposition testimony, Mr. Kirk Williamson of White Water was asked "if it's 
typical for installers to keep materials in their trucks or trailers overnight at their home" and if 
Sundquist's practice for going home directly from a job site and not go back to White Water until 
the next morning was typical of installers at the company. Mr. Williamson answered that it 
"probably happens" and that practice "would be typical." (Deposition of Mr. Williamson pg. 28, 
lines 20-23, pg. 29 lines2 -7). 
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Vvliife Vl.tlei sli \ i1 "M 'il'i"\ <i I hide behind the coming and going rule and call 
Sir i -* ^ Tni Ui-d.n of the accident a mere commute in work because it exerused no 
control over Sin ldquist's trip and because the materials * • si 
before. " ^ n ^ : s > lcturn the products the night 
1 * •» • ' i1 .* noii ol returning them iIK next day. 
Indeed, it is clear that had Sundquist been r e q u i r e to return, the pmdi... 
before ;;;id had +he accident occurred, he w have rlpm |y li;i\ r i rnumcd in the course 
and v-i-p-. ' *• i nv, Gallic v\ould likely he true 1iad 
While Water allowed Sundquist to Kimn u- the job site 'he vc^t morning to retrieve the 
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• T>MING AND GOING RULE 
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that White Water stood to benefit from 
1 laving Sundquist return its materials at tlw .i ;>'.<. •!• .^, m 
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the dual purpose exception to the coming and going rule comes into play, requiring an 
inquiry into the predominant purpose of Sundquist's trip. See Ahlstroiru 2002 UT at [^14 
("If an employee's personal conduct benefits an employer, we have implied that the 
employer may be held liable where the predominant purpose of the conduct was not 
personal."). 
Despite White Water's arguments to the contrary, the fact that Sundquist was 
returning materials from the previous day's job to White Water while also traveling to 
work to receive new assignments did not just pose a tangential benefit to White Water. 
To determine "whether business was the predominant purpose for the trip," the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he inquiry is whether the trip is one which would have 
required the employer to send another employee over the same route or to perform the 
same function if the trip had not been made." IcL White Water again attempts to cloud 
the inquiry by asserting that the fact that Sundquist had taken the materials home to be 
returned the next day—and the fact that his job duties did not including transporting 
materials to his home—somehow eliminates White Water's need to nevertheless have the 
products returned. The fact still remains, however, that if Sundquist did not return the 
materials when he did, White Water would have been required to send someone else to 
retrieve the same materials and travel the same route that Sundquist as traveling at the 
time of the accident. 
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errand and an accident occurs while the employee is on that detour or errand. See, e.g.. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). Utah cases have also 
recognized, however, that liability reattaches when the employee resumes his employment 
after the detour or errand. Id 
White Water essentially argues that due to the overnight duration of Sundquist's 
deviation from carrying White Water's materials from the job-site to its offices according 
to his job duties, liability should not reattach when he is back en route to White Water. 
The duration of the detour or personal errand does not necessarily determine whether 
liability reattaches once the detour has ended. The inquiry u[i]n situations where 
accidents have occurred substantially within the normal spatial boundaries of 
employment," as in this case, instead focuses on whether the employee has ureturn[ed] to 
their duties and an accident occurs." Id. at 1042. No case has otherwise placed explicit 
time limits on the duration of personal errands or detours. 
Here, at the time of the accident, Sundquist had returned to his duty from the 
previous day's job to return unused materials to White Water's offices at the time of the 
accident. His stopover at home with the materials in his possession was a personal 
detour—allowed by White Water—which ended once he began his return trip to White 
Water.3 
3
 The personal detour rule would only preserve White Water from liability in this case had 
the accident occurred while Sundquist was traveling to his home the night before. In that 
instance, Sundquist's travel would be considered a personal detour or errand during which White 
Water would not be liable for his actions. Once Sundquist left his home and returned to the route 
8 
Newman 1 las not argued that Anderson v. Gobea, 5<•! - \ « ; \:., *< 
1972) is controlling in this case, but nevei tl ieles.- <n * e anu 
ins t ruc t s 1.1 uu p e " t/: ri.Mnpis to distinguish the case by 
as-, *"". r'nyee in Anderson was asked to perform an artivity that was 
different froin h^ other activities as an employee a... ... ,i • ;i- • d. 
The facts set forth in Anderson ( ' . - •• - - - ^evei , that the employee's 
acliniis wen ,11 :' ••«* •' • >ni wnai luajob nurmaii) equircd. Instead, all that is found 
in the facts cited is thai die employee "was employed as a handyman ar„. /.*.;; . 
for appellee" and that for a particular job IK: was dMigt""1 'I '"\ >'li iln h -ni^ iu*i lation and 
safekeeping c: .. • •< » *-h ^' n 4 J 7 . What is more, the 
Ai i/ona conn did i lot analyze the case as a special errand situation but as a dual purpose' 
scenario where "the work of the employee create[d] the necessit ^..n 
he [was] serving at the sarm una/- - •• d ai4j/-458. 
Consequent., Anderson r- - .; .•-« >r -1 " , HI its facts as White 
*« .»gL t • •• • a,-.i.; .1 Tiers an insightful example of !HH\ die issue before ih:•; 
Court has been approached in other jurisdictions; it shoi ild IH cm-, »ukied m \ s 
argument accordingly. 
he would have been required to travel to return the materials the ilight before—had Wlute Water 
insisted on their return rather than allowing him to carry them home first—Sundquist returned to 
his duties, ending the detour and once again attaching liability to White Water for his actions. 
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V, Applicability of AHLSTROM 
In addressing Newman's analysis of the applicability of the Ahlstrom case, White 
Water asserts that there is no factual support in the record for the assertion that Sundquist 
was being paid to transport White Water's materials. White Water asserts that Sundquist 
instead was merely paid for the installation of White Water's materials, receiving a 
percentage of each job he worked on only for installation and not hauling the product 
installed to and from the job site. It is nevertheless undisputed that Sundquist's job 
responsibilities specifically included transporting White Water's products to and from job 
sites, (R.60, ffl[ 2 and 3), and that he was paid a percentage of each job he worked on. 
Given the undisputed facts—when viewed in the light most favorable to Newman 
and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—it goes without saying that 
included in the percentage of pay Sundquist received for the installation of White Water's 
products was remuneration for transporting the products to the job site. While true, as 
White Water points out, that without actual installation there would be no payment, it is 
also true that without transportation of the materials there would be no installation. And 
as Sundquist was required to haul materials to the job site and install them and then return 
any unused products to White Water, it would certainly theoretically not be unthinkable 
for White Water to withhold Sundquist's percentage of any job he worked on where he 
did not transport unused materials back to White Water from a job-site, at least until such 
items were returned, as it was clearly part of his job duties to do so.. 
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As si- ; ' duties and tl ic payment he received foi fulfilling his 
ies cannot be separated into finite categories with the payment he received attached 
solely to one category of job duty over the other. Aeennlin^ In |i|«.; niipin\nn,iit 
arrangement w iiu not selectively fulfill some of this job 
d' ! ••- • >lete the projects as assigned; his pay was accordingly render for all of 
his job duties and not merely limited to installation. 
In addition, the analysis of the Ahlstrom case in Newman's opening in ict «tncs m »t 
draw a distinction between the size « :' sug versus those the 
officer was i ;r i ; Amstrom, as White Water argues. As argued, Newman's analysis 
focuses on the distinction that Sundquist did not just "happen" to be carrying with him 
tools or materials related to h;~ ioh while commuting to nr lioin w o i i like ihc officer in 
Ahlstrom, but he was dclibet.iieh, haiisfKi hue White Water products from the job-site to 
W Inic \\"ater's offices as required by his job. Ahlstrom is further distinguishable as it 
deals with the liability of cities for commuting accidents of police oi \u .ei> UM e •! rs 
where the trip poses no benefits to . . . •. .n^iiuiTu 2002 UT 4 at 
II1 i -dcLd officer in Ahlstrom was traveling home from a required 
meeting, a trip that presented no obvious benefit to the police department. IdL at ^| J"„ I ^ 
Here, however, there is a clear benefit to White Water from Sundquist5s trip ai llie 
time of the accident, distinguishing the present n . M I J M K . U -
11 
VI. AT A MINIMUM THERE IS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE 
JURY/REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER. 
White Water's final argument asserts—as the trial court held—that no reasonable 
mind could find that Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment and that 
the question of whether Sundquist was in acting within the scope of his employment was 
properly taken from the jury by summary judgment. Given the facts of the case, though, 
reasonable minds could certainly differ as to whether at the time of the accident Sundquist 
was involved wholly or partly in the perfomiance of White Water's business and whether 
the predominant purpose of his trip benefitted Wliite Water and outweighed any personal 
benefit to Sundquist. The scope of employment question should not therefore have been 
taken from the jury on summary judgment. 
Utah case law is clear that the inquiry into "[w]hether an employee is acting within 
the scope of her employment is ordinarily a question of fact." IcL Thus, "[t]he question 
must be submitted to the jury "'whenever reasonable minds may differ as to whether the 
[employee] was at a certain time involved wholly or partly in the performance of [the 
employer's] business or within the scope of employment.' " Id (quoting Carter v. Bessey, 
97 Utah 427, 432, 93 P.2d 490, 493 (1939)). Consequently, it is only in the clearest of 
circumstances that an "employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the scope of 
employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue as a 
matter of law." Id.; Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989); 
Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994). For example, an employee's 
12 
cond .g to assault and battery is conduct that is so clearly outside the scope of 
employment that a trial court could decide the issue as a matter of law. See, e.g., D.D.Z. 
v. Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 88<« i ., . . i 
question is pro} 
At a minimum, '•»i*-' case prcst.Mi1*- a situation where reasonable minds could clearly 
differ as to whether Sundquist was within the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. Summary judgment was incorrectly granted * wersed. 
CONCLUSION 
Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment a I Ilk; IIIIH; ol I be 
accident, Consequently, Newm; . anient on tlle issue should 
have been graiited. Newman respectfully requests that this court accordingly reverse the 
trial court's ruling and enter summary judgment in his favor on the issue. 
At a minimum, the issue of whether Sundquist was within the course and scope of 
his employment should have been left loi llii nirv l*> do ide as ic.isonaMt tnuul-. i ould 
differ < • issue. h ,i should the ti lal court have ruled, as a matter of law, that 
Sundquist was not in the course and scope of his employment. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^_ day of May 2007. 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C. 
Paul C. Fan-
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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